This article reconsiders the concept of autonomy of migration (CAM) in the context of technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes by focusing on the case of biometric rebordering. As its name suggests, the CAM's core thesis proposes that migratory movements yield moments of autonomy in regards to any attempt to control and regulate them. Yet, the CAM has been repeatedly accused of being based on and contributing to a romanticisation of migration. After outlining two advantages the CAM offers for the analysis of biometric border regimes, I demonstrate that processes of biometric rebordering increase the warranty of the two allegations, which feed this major critique. Drawing on examples relating to the Visa Information System (VIS), I show, moreover, that processes of biometric rebordering alter the practical terms and material conditions for moments of autonomy of migration to such an extent that it becomes necessary to rethink not only some of the CAM's central features, but the notion of autonomy itself. In the final section I therefore point out some directions to develop the CAM as an approach, which is better equipped to investigate today's struggles of migration without being prone to the critique of implicating a romanticisation of migration.
understands itself as a contribution to this ongoing undertaking. It argues that the material terms and practical conditions for the emergence of possible moments of autonomy of migration have changed significantly due to the increased technologisation of border regimes.
Yet, the existing literature on the concept of autonomy of migration (CAM) has so far not sufficiently acknowledged the impact of the technologisation of border controls on the possibilities of migrants to appropriate what contemporary border and migration regimes seek to deny them, namely: mobility and rights. What has hindered the advocates of the CAM so far to take the technologisation of border controls and its effects on migrants' room for manoeuvre seriously is the misreading of the interrelated securitisation of migration as a mere means for the economic exploitation of migrant labour. 4 This is why the CAM's core hypothesis has been largely articulated as an unqualified generalisation to date: moments of autonomy seem to emerge and operate within any border and migration regime irrespective of its legal, practical and technological composition.
In this article I therefore reconsider the CAM in face of the ongoing technologisation of border controls by focusing on the challenges posed by biometric rebordering. My analysis is driven by the following question: In which directions has the CAM to be refined to better account for the impact of the technologisation of border control on the emergence of possible moments of autonomy of migration?
To answer this question, I first outline six core features of the CAM. This enables me to bring out two conceptual advantages the CAM yields for the investigation and critique of biometric border regimes. In the second and third section I reconsider the two allegations that fuel the major critique, according to which the CAM is based on, but also contributes to a 4 While it is hardly disputed that migration has been securitised in the course of the Europeanisation of migration policy, it is still contested how securitisation should be conceptualised. Benjamin Muller, "Risking it all at the Biometric Border: Mobility, Limits, and the Persistence of Securitisation," Geopolitics 16, no. 1 (2011). Thierry Balzacq has introduced a useful distinction between 'philosophical' and 'sociological' approaches. romanticisation of migration. It becomes more urgent to address these criticisms, as their warranty increases in the context of biometric rebordering. In the final section I therefore point out some directions for re-thinking the CAM in order to develop it as an approach that is better equipped to investigate and intervene in today's struggles of migration within and against technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes and which is no longer prone to the critique of contributing to a romanticisation of migration.
What makes this undertaking necessary is the 'technological imperative' 5 driving processes of rebordering in Europe and around the globe. In the context of Europe, the gradual build-up of the surveillance system SIVE along Spanish coasts since 1999 offers an illuminating example. It comprises a network of mobile infrared cameras and high resolution radars, granting patrol boats of the Guardia Civil a response time of up to three hours for intercepting boats with undocumented migrants before their expected arrival on Spanish shores. 6 So far the CAM's proponents have argued that neither the implementation of ever more restrictive migration policies nor the introduction of technologically ever more sophisticated border controls could inhibit migration, but only downgrade the conditions, under which it occurs. 7 Indeed, one can trace how the gradual build-up of SIVE implicated a geographical shift to longer and more dangerous migration routes to areas, where it had not yet been installed. 8 But what happens if an avoidance of technologically highly sophisticated border controls is no longer possible, because they have become generalised? This is by no means a hypothetical question. In the EUROSUR project the European Union (EU) seeks to integrate existing national systems like SIVE into a 'system of the systems' covering its entire maritime border. It also seeks to bring existing surveillance and interception mechanisms to perfection through improved sensors, satellites and unmanned vehicles. 9 Moreover, EUROSUR is just one expression of the endorsement of technology as a cornerstone of ongoing processes of rebordering in Europe. 10 It is complemented by proposals for an entry-exit-system using biometric technologies to record the arrival and departure dates of travellers, who are not EU citizens, or a 'registered traveller programme' permitting participants to enter through automated gates under the condition that they submit themselves to a screening procedure prior to their departure. 11 While these examples are still projects in the making, the EU has already build-up an impressive architecture of biometric databases, including the EURODAC system for asylum seekers and unauthorised border crossers, the Visa Information System (VIS) for all third country nationals applying for a Schengen visa and, finally, the Schengen Information System (SIS) that registers, among others, migrants who are deported after being apprehended inside the Schengen area. 12 In this article I illustrate my general claims concerning the impact of the technologisation of border controls on the practical terms and material conditions for the possible emergence of moments of autonomy of migration through examples relating to the VIS.
Politicising the technologisation of border regimes with the CAM: beyond the control bias
It is important to note that the CAM has always been conceived by its proponents as a political intervention in both migration policy discourse and the politics of the antiracist movement. This brings me to the first of the CAM's six central features that I will outline in this section. First, and in contrast to some of the most influential migration theories, the CAM stresses the subjective and social dimensions of migration in order to critique any conception of migration as a dependent variable of 'objective' factors like poverty or wage differentials, as suggested by neoclassical migration theories, or the destruction of subsistence economies through the expansion of capitalism in the global South, as suggested by the world-system theory. 13 Any reduction of migration to structural underlying causes ignores the subjective 11 Ben Hayes and Mathias Vermeulen, "Borderline. The EU's New Border Surveillance Initiatives " (Berlin: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2012). 12 EURODAC stores the fingerprints of apprehended border crossers and asylum seekers in order to facilitate the implementation of the Dublin II regulation, which stipulates that asylum seekers have to lodge their application in the member state through which they have entered the EU. Yet, EURODAC is also increasingly used for the re-identification of irregular migrants, thereby resembling a prime example for 'function creep' i.e. the usage of databases for purposes beyond the initially stated objectives. The VIS will soon be the largest biometric database in the world as it stores the fingerprints and facial images of the up to 20 million people, who annually apply for a Schengen visa, for a period of five years. Therefore, migration is conceived, second, as a 'dynamic force' with the potential to instigate social transformation processes. 16 In brief, the subjective movement of living labour constitutes a driving force in the evolution of capital accumulation. 17 The institution of wage labour as a crucial moment in the history of capitalism was, for instance, prompted by the escape of slaves from the plantation economies. 18 Likewise, contemporary migrations are structurally in excess of the equilibriums of (national) labour markets and codified forms of citizenship, that practices of rebordering try to maintain, thereby forcing these (and other)
institutions into a process of permanent reorganisation and adaptation. 19 30 Mezzadra, "The gaze of autonomy: capitalism, migration and social struggles." The concept of 'deportability' asserts in regards to the function of deportations that not their actual execution is decisive, but that already the fact of their possible execution establishes a condition of deportability, which disciplines irregular migrants to a flexible, exploitable workforce. Nicholas De Genova, "Migrant "Illegality" and Deportability in Everyday Life," Annual Review of Anthropology 31, no. 3 (2002) . 31 Karakayali and Tsianos, "Mapping the Order of New Migration. Undokumentierte Arbeit und die Autonomie der Migration," 50. 32 Bojadžijev and Karakayali, "Autonomie der Migration. 10 Thesen zu einer Methode," 204; author's translation.
noted that they concern the investigation of technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes in general beyond the case of biometric borders discussed here.
First, the CAM is well equipped to counter the control bias that characterises the existing literature on biometric border controls. The bulk of this literature focuses its analysis on the practices, technologies, installations, devices, statements and agencies that characterise the appearance and make-up of biometric borders in specific contexts, sites or programmes in order to reveal their key features, underlying rationalities and effects. 33 sites of intensified political struggles over the selective denial and appropriation of mobility and rights. 37 The technological details of biometric border controls are no longer catalogued in a meticulous description of supposedly omnipotent control apparatuses. They rather emerge as the terrain of as well as stakes within migrants' struggles over the direct appropriation of mobility and rights. These silent and clandestine, but inherently political struggles manifest themselves in those multiple sites and situations, in which the practices and tactics of abjectified migrants encounter the techniques and devices of control. It is through the empirical investigation of these encounters by means of a multi-sited ethnography that scholars can bring out these multiple struggles, thereby avoiding a static and control biased analysis. 38 As a result, today's biometric borders would no longer appear as sites of perfect mobility control, ultimately constituting a 'cyber-fortress' in the making. 39 They would rather emerge as the battleground of dynamic political struggles over the selective denial and direct appropriation of mobility and rights.
It is this conception of biometric borders as sites of political struggles, through which the CAM permits researchers, secondly, to counter the de-politicisation of border controls 44 The failure of technologies to deliver the promised perfect security translates into a call for the implementation of more and better technologies by security professionals.
In this context, the CAM allows critical scholars to precipitate a re-politicisation of border controls by depicting them as the terrain of political struggles, which can not be solved through the implementation of technologies, because they concern the access of abjectified migrants to mobility and rights. These struggles and contestations are initiated by migrants'
attempts to appropriate what border controls seek to deprive them of: mobility and rights.
Consequently, migrants' practices of direct appropriation and the struggles they instigate are inherently political in themselves. For it is these practices of abjectified migrants, which render today's biometric borders, as well as the legally codified forms of citizenship and the socioeconomic status quo they try to maintain, as objects of contestation and dissent.
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Attempts to counter the de-politicisation of border controls afford, therefore, that scholars follow the CAM's suggestion to conceive migrants not as passive objects of control, but as crucial actors in the make-up of the multiple sites and situations at today's biometric borders.
It is then an investigation of migrants' practices of direct contestation and appropriation, which has to be the starting and focal point of an analysis of biometric borders that aims at their re-politicisation.
Moreover, numerous scholars in critical security studies have criticised that the discriminatory effects of border controls become concealed, but nevertheless persist and even intensify in the context of biometric rebordering. I discuss this point in detail in the next section. 42 
The CAM revisited I: autonomy or romanticisation of migration?
The CAM is, however, not without problems itself. As I have noted in the introduction, the CAM, and most importantly, its generalised attribution of moments of autonomy to any migratory movement are repeatedly criticised for being based on as well as contributing to a romanticisation of migration. This major critique is fuelled by two interrelated allegations.
Considering each of these two allegations in this section and the next, I demonstrate that their warranty increases in the context of biometric rebordering.
First, the CAM is accused of not sufficiently considering the diversity of conditions, under which migration occurs. 46 According to critics, this diversity of conditions arises from both migrants' unequal access to resources and the varying degrees of discrimination they experience due to the prevalence of sexist and racist discourses throughout the migration process. Martina Benz and Helen Schwenken attribute this neglect to the notion of autonomy itself that would reduce the diverse social conditions surrounding migration to a juxtaposition of state versus migrants. 47 The CAM would frame migrants as a single autonomous collective subject, while ignoring their different subject positions and the specific constraints and privileges these subject positions entail. Following the concept of triple oppression, they insist that the combined, but individually varying effects of racism, sexism and capitalism have to be considered in order to assess in how far particular migrations yield emancipatory results or rather contribute to the re-articulation of relations of domination and exploitation.
Members of Transit Migration have in turn refuted this criticism as a misinterpretation of the CAM, which would emphasise the autonomy of migratory movements, but not of individual subjects. 48 They argue that Benz and Schwenken's critique reflects a 'naïve empiricism of the subject', which confuses the difference between a situated analysis of the border regime from the perspective of migration with a purely empirical investigation of migrants' subjectivities. They maintain, by contrast, that such a situated analysis can only be attained by using border-transgressing biographies and the practices of migration as empirical Colonial as well as postcolonial situation, caste, 'race', gender, [and] ethnicity need to be considered conjointly.
The significance of these categories has been acknowledged by now, and each of them has generated a new knowledge: Postcolonial and subaltern studies, minority studies, feminisms all have enriched the notion of autonomy with their respective perspective and invested it with an appropriate complexity. Autonomy is the opposite of heteronomy: not to be dependent, free of effects of domination. Only a situated knowledge (Donna Haraway) can be effectively independent, and correspondingly, one has to protect oneself from the effect of domination, that lurks beneath 'objective' thinking. 57 Moulier Boutang's acknowledgment of the complexity of the notion of autonomy recognises the diversity of its conditions and the varying degrees of its possible realisation. Yet, none of the CAM's advocates has so far pursued the implicit call to develop a more nuanced reading of autonomy, which is no longer prone to subsume and erase migrants' varying experiences under a subjectless abstraction like migration. 58 But the need to re-think the CAM in way, which underscores the situatedness and the resulting diversity of migrants' embodied experiences, becomes even more acute in context of the technologisation of border controls. Critical scholarship on biometric rebordering points out that the differential treatment of migrants according to their positionality in sociopolitical power relations of class, 'race', gender, age and sexual orientation is both intensified and increasingly concealed through the biometrification of border controls.
On the one hand, biometric technologies implicate a differentiation of how the border is experienced. This is far from surprising, if one considers that biometric technologies imply a shift from 'border control to body control.' 59 Since biometrics seek to verify the claimed identity of an individual by comparing a representation of one of its biometric features against a digitalised template that has been stored in a database or on an access card like a passport, they allow for a more differentiated and individualised approach towards border controls.
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Biometrics permit to replace systematic checks for the targeted control of travellers classified as 'risky' at the physical border in order to accelerate the mobility of 'trusted' travellers. The latter submit themselves to pre-departure checks, thereby trading privacy for speed. 61 The enrolment in a trusted traveller scheme like NEXUS in Northern America, 62 'Project Iris' in the UK 63 or the SmartGate system in Australia 64 allows 'trusted travellers' for an experience of 'borders lite', comprising fast lanes, business lounges and self-policing at automated border check posts. 65 Travellers who do not want or simply can not participate in these programmes, either because they can not afford them or because 'they come from the wrong background' are, by contrast, automatically deemed 'risky'. 66 They have to queue repeatedly, either for interrogations at consular posts whilst applying for a visa or for intensified inspections in airports upon arrival. By sorting individuals into fast-moving, low-risk 'kinetic elites' and slow-moving, high-risk 'kinetic underclasses' biometric borders actively produce mobile subjectivities. 67 The differentiation of how the biometric border is experienced by particular individuals is, however, determined by their respective subject position in terms of class, country of origin, skin colour, gender, age and sexual orientation. 68 Trusted traveller schemes highlight, moreover, that the alleged privilege to jump the queue, as well as the symbolic capital that comes with it, only come about in relation to the unprivileged in the queue. 69 What the usage of biometric technologies in voluntary trusted traveller schemes and databases only mandatory for those considered 'high-risk' then brings to the fore is that mobility is, in fact, always embodied and relational.
On the other hand, it is precisely this connection between the differential treatment of mobile individuals and their respective positionality in terms of class, race and gender, which is concealed by biometric border controls technologies. The latter supposedly do not suffer from the prejudices shared by human beings as they verify a person's claimed identity on the basis of features of its biological body independently of any factors, which might be regarded as discriminatory (such as class, 'race', gender or sexuality). 70 Irma van der Ploeg has succinctly argued, by contrast, that biometrics transform the biological body into a machine readable 'text'. She emphasises that 'the meaning and significance' of this machine readable text is contingent upon 'the context', in which it is produced, and the relations, which are established with other 'texts'. 71 It is through both the social context, in which biometrics are deployed, and the comparisons, for which the machine readable texts they produce are used, that all forms of discrimination in terms of class, 'race' and gender come into play.
In the context of border controls, biometric technologies are not only used for the maintenance of the political and socioeconomic status quo by regulating the access to and exclusion from mobility, rights and geographical spaces. In addition, they also create new inequalities. The trusted traveller programmes mentioned above illustrate that biometric technologies contribute to the creation of a privileged 'kinetic elite'. Membership to this exclusive club is only open to those who can afford it and are classified as 'low risk'. The VIS exemplifies, by contrast, that the enrolment into biometric databases becomes mandatory for all those, who are regarded as a security or 'migration risk'. In order to be able to capture and critique these discriminatory effects of biometric borders it becomes necessary to develop the CAM as an approach, which conceives mobility as both embodied and relational. For feminist migration scholars have shown that unrestricted access to mobility of some is connected to the restriction of the access to mobility for others. 72 But the CAM needs to better account for the diversity of migrants' subject positions and the resulting diversity of their migration experiences and border crossing practices. This is necessary in order to retain the capacity to critique, how technologically 'consolidated identities for some produce marginalised locations for others' within material-semiotic contexts, in which sexist and racist discourse and practices are virulent. 73 What becomes therefore even more urgent in the context of biometric rebordering is the development of a reading of autonomy that allows for a situated analysis of migrants' embodied and consequently diverse encounters with and experiences of today's biometric borders.
The CAM revisited II: autonomy of migration despite of its securitisation?
In addition, the CAM has been accused of an unfounded stylisation of migrants to self-reliant heroes of clandestine border crossing. In brief, critics maintain the CAM's proponents would systematically gloss over the repressive and sometimes murderous effects of ever more restrictive border controls, which often resulted in the effective exclusion of migrants. 74 In this section I argue that it becomes necessary to consider this criticism, because it becomes more warranted in the context of the securitisation of migration and interrelated processes of biometric rebordering. Biometric databases alter the encounters and power relations between migrants and border control authorities to such an extent that it becomes necessary to re-think some of the CAM's core assumptions, including the notion of autonomy itself.
In my opinion, it is the insufficient consideration of the securitisation of migration and its bearing on the rationale and design of contemporary border regimes, which justifies the 72 Hyndman, "The (Geo)politics of Mobility "; Rygiel, "Governing borderzones of mobility through e-borders: the politics of embodied mobility. involves the invocation of a politics of fear that reduces possible migration policy options to strategies of distancing and neutralising the 'risks' that are associated with human mobility. 80 Through the politics of fear migrants are constructed as a risk for potential harm, which has to be kept at a spatial and social distance through a plethora of illiberal security practices. 81 Consequently, the securitisation of migration has, in fact, strong implications for the design, composition and underlying rationale of today's border regimes.
This does, however, not imply that I propose to simply replace the prioritisation of the question of labour in the understanding and analysis of contemporary border regimes with the securitisation of migration. Nor do I suggest that the paradigm of exclusion, which has been so vividly criticised by the CAM's advocates, has become the dominant rationale of today's border regimes due to the securitisation of migration. Numerous CSS-scholars have repeatedly shown that the security framing of migration does not implicate a repression of human mobility through a fortification of borders. 82 Following Foucault, they have argued that security is not opposed to freedom of movement, but rather emerges as its 'correlative'. 83 They emphasise that the speed and comfort of unrestricted mobility for the normalised majority of travellers hinges on the intensified control and possible banishment of those classified as 'risky'. This particular mode of exclusion does, however, not work through the interdiction or prevention of mobility, but rather produces a mobile satellite population, which is kept at a social and spatial distance, but simultaneously on the move and in circulation.
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Put differently, banishment does not aim at the repression, but at the institutionalisation of mobility as it deflects and reflects the movements of those deemed 'undesirable'. This more nuanced reading of differential inclusion offered by critical security studies is better equipped to account for the restrictive effects of technologically ever more sophisticated border controls. It's adoption by the CAM presupposes, however, to acknowledge that security does not only work as a force of differentiation, but also as 'a force of abjection excluding risky migrants from trusted travellers'. 85 It is then important to consider the securitisation of migration in the analysis and conceptualisation of border regimes, because it is the complex interplay between the obsession for maximum security brought about by the politics of fear and the economic imperative to facilitate the circulation of commodities and living labour, which fuels the ongoing technologisation of border controls.
Instead of prioritising one of these allegedly conflicting governmental desires over the other, I therefore suggest to conceptualise contemporary border regimes with Foucault's notion of the security dispositif. For the latter captures nicely that freedom is not a value in opposition to or in tension with security concerns. Rather, freedom constitutes a technique of government as it has been reframed as freedom of movement. As such, it provides the raison d'être of the security dispositif. 86 Following Foucault, Bigo argues that the reduction of freedom to the promise of global mobility without being stopped ultimately allows for 'policing in the name of freedom', 87 resulting in ever more pervasive dataveillance. 88 In
Foucault's words, ' […] freedom [of movement] is nothing but the correlative development of apparatuses of security.' 89 The security dispositif is not concerned with the protection of the territory of sovereign spaces, but with governing a population in a way that optimises its life potentials and its economic productivity. 90 Its 'problem […] is no longer that of fixing and demarcating the territory, but of allowing circulations to take place, of controlling them, of sifting the good and the bad, ensuring that things are always in movement […] , but in such a way that the inherent dangers of this circulation are cancelled out.' 91 Foucault indicates that the surveillance of the population becomes a substitute for the protection previously offered by the now dismantled city walls in order to identify individuals within the now freely circulating flows, who might impinge on the economic productivity of the population. 92 He specifies that the security dispositif is concerned with anticipating, identifying, minimising potentially harmful elements within the circulating flows through the statistical calculation of possible future behaviours and events. Foucault's stance that the security dispositif 'works on the future' 93 is in conflict with the CAM's premise that migrations temporarily precede the attempts to control and regulate them. Yet, it is precisely the adoption of this endeavour to render uncertain futures knowable and actionable, which explains the appeal of contemporary border regimes to information, identification and surveillance technologies, thereby bringing the third element of the triptych security -freedom of movement -technology into play.
I would therefore like to suggest that it is precisely the misreading of the securitisation of migration as a mere modality for the disenfranchisement and economic exploitation of migrants, which has hindered some of the most prominent advocates of the CAM so far to take the technologisation of border controls and its restrictive effects seriously. This is, however, important, because biometric databases and related border control technologies like the planned entry-exit-system or the EUROSUR project alter the power relations and the encounters between migrants and border control authorities to such an extent that the general assertion of moments of autonomy of migration within any border regime regardless of its legal, practical and technological composition becomes, in fact, a highly dubious claim.
I illustrate my argument with two examples relating to the VIS, because its impact on the possibilities of abjectified migrants to appropriate Schengen visa and subsequently stay in Europe is of particular relevance for the CAM's core thesis. For contrary to the misleading scandalisation of boat migration in the media and by policy makers, most illegalised migrants in Europe do not cross the EU's borders unauthorised, but enter via airports with a valid Schengen visa only to become illegal after it has expired. 94 The first example relates to the objective of the VIS to prevent the so-called practice of 'visa shopping'. 95 This pejorative term refers to the strategy of visa applicants to lodge consecutive applications at consulates of several EU member states, after an initial application has already been turned down. While consulates of Schengen member states have begun to stamp the passports of rejected visa applicants, the latter could previously still lodge further applications at consulates of other member states by obtaining a new passport. 96 Yet, the VIS efficiently forecloses this possibility for rejected applicants, because consular staff can now check in the biometric database, which also stores the fingerprint templates of rejected applicants for a period of five years, 'if this fingerprint has already applied for a visa'. 97 The second example refers to the objective of the VIS 'to assist in the identification of any person who may not, or may no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the territory of the Member States.' 98 On a practical level, and in less euphemistic terms, the VIS shall facilitate the provision of travel documents for undocumented migrants, who try to hide their identity after being detected by the police, in order to accelerate their deportation.
As Dennis Broeders has rightly argued, the VIS will thereby function as a 'system of reidentification' for so-called 'visa-overstayers'. 99 For the purpose of identification a newly generated template of a fingerprint is compared to the up to 70 million templates stored in the information deprived of all corporality in order to create data doubles, which refer back to the individual concerned. The purpose of these data doubles is not to represent the individuals they refer to in an accurate manner, but to enable border control authorities to re-identify and make judgements about them. 105 Ultimately, biometric databases like the VIS turn migrants' bodies into a means of mobility control, thereby generating a new form of irregularity: the irregularity of the 'data double'. 106 It is precisely this new form of irregularity, which brings to the fore that biometric databases like the VIS intensify the restrictive and exclusionary effects of border controls as they forestall previously successful mobility strategies. It is through the generation of data doubles and the related establishment traceability of people's migration histories that biometric databases like the VIS make it possible to synchronise controls and resulting sanctions. Information on visa applicants, which has been previously scattered over the countless folders of the 3.500 consular posts the EU's member states maintain worldwide, does not only become available, it also accessible within seconds. Since the start of operation of the VIS it just takes consular staff a few seconds to check if an applicant has already been refused a visa and to reject his application. 107 Through the storage of biometric characteristics it is no longer possible for apprehended migrants to forestall a deportation by destroying their passports and concealing their identity. Rather, visa overstayers are now haunted by their data doubles: If their fingerprints are stored in the VIS, it just takes authorities a few hours to establish their identity and country of origin in order to deport them as soon as possible.
Hence, biometric technologies do not only imply a qualitative shift in the efficiency and scope of border controls. More importantly, biometric databases significantly alter the encounters and power relations between migrants and border control authorities. In case of the detection of undocumented migrants, border control authorities no longer depend on the cooperation of migrants to re-identify them, because their data doubles replace their narratives as a source of truth. 108 Thereby, biometric databases considerably diminish migrants' room for manoeuvre.
To be clear: I am not arguing that biometric rebordering completely deprives migration of its moments of autonomy. Nor do I claim that the appropriation of mobility and rights has become impossible for abjectified migrants within biometric border regimes. 109 My point is rather that the introduction of biometric technologies for border control purposes significantly alters the practical terms and material conditions for the appropriation of mobility. The reason is that biometric technologies render migrants' bodies as a means of control by transforming them into data doubles. Escaping these 'digital alter egos', which determine, if a person is granted a visa or not, and which enable the reconstruction of a person's migration history in order to facilitate her deportation, is no longer simply a matter of burning ones passport. What the fact that asylum seekers have resorted to deliberately cutting or burning their fingerprints in order to prevent an enrolment into EURODAC indicates is that it will afford nothing less than to alter or destroy the minutiae of ones fingerprints. 
Conclusion: Rethinking the autonomy of migration -rethinking autonomy
In this article I have attributed the neglect of the technologisation of border controls and its effects on migrants' room for manoeuvre by the existing CAM-literature to a misreading of the securitisation of migration as a mere means for the disenfranchisement and economic exploitation of migrant labour. In order to overcome this economic reductionism I have proposed to draw on Foucault's notion of the security dispositif to conceptualise today's border regimes. As Foucault perceives the security dispositif primarily as a dispositif of circulation, it brings out that security concerns and the promotion of freedom of movement are not in tension, but operate in tandem. It is the interplay between the two, which drives the adoption of a pro-active risk management approach that in turn explains the 'technological imperative' characterising contemporary processes of rebordering.
But the conception of contemporary border regimes as security dispositifs affords to reconsider at least two of the CAM's propositions. First, abjection and banishment have to be conceived as integral moments of governing human mobility through differential inclusion.
Adopting the notion of banishment does, however, not imply a return to the paradigm of exclusion. In contrast to exclusion banishment does not aim at the repression of mobility, but at its institutionalisation. The abject are kept in constant rotation by being subjected to the paradoxical freedom of the ban 'to go anywhere except where one wants to go.' 111 This is important to note, because it was the paradigm of exclusion the CAM's proponents sought to critique and replace with the notion of differential inclusion in the first place.
Second, the CAM needs a new justification for the analytical-strategical prioritisation of migrants' practices. It is important to retain this feature of the CAM, because it efficiently allows for avoiding a control biased analysis of technologically ever more sophisticated borders regimes. But the CAM's proposition, whereupon migration temporarily precedes the attempts to control and regulate it, becomes untenable in the face of the security dispositif's risk management approach, which strives to render unknown future behaviours knowable in order to make them actionable and governable. What this pro-active risk management approach brings to the fore is that the CAM's assumption of a temporal precedence of migration is underpinned by a reductive reading of power relations. 112 It therefore becomes requisite to rethink the concept of autonomy in such a way that it offers an alternative, more convincing justification for analytical-strategical prioritisation of migrants' practices.
This brings me to the final, albeit most crucial modification of the CAM: the challenge to rethink the meaning of autonomy in relation to migration. To engage with this challenge is necessary in order to develop the CAM as an approach, which is no longer prone to the accusation of being based on as well as contributing to a romanticisation of migration. It becomes urgent to engage with this challenge, because the warranty of the two allegations, 111 Bigo which fuel this major critique, increases in the context of biometric rebordering. The analysis of the impact of biometric technologies on migrants' possibilities to appropriate mobility and rights allows me to indicate two starting points for the task to rethink autonomy as a concept.
First, it is important to develop of a situated reading of autonomy, which captures, that mobility is always embodied and relational in order to bring out the diversity of migrants' lived experiences and practices. This is a prerequisite for restoring the CAM's capacity to critique the discriminatory effects of biometric borders. The latter imply a simultaneous intensification and concealment of the differentiation of how the border is experienced, depending on people's subject position in terms of class, 'race', gender, country of origin, age and other factors. Donna Haraway's concept of situated knowledge offers a promising starting point for such a re-reading of autonomy. Just as the forms and practices of migration are shaped by, and can therefore not be separated from, the conditions, under which they occur, the emergence of moments of autonomy can not be thought independently of the ever more pervasive and intrusive governmental technologies that seek to control and regulate migration. Autonomy has to be rethought as a relational concept. Ranabir Samaddar's proposal to read autonomy as 'the "Other" of governmentality' might offer a promising starting point for this task.
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While it is beyond the scope of this article to rethink the autonomy of migration, it should be underscored that this is an endeavour, which is both worthwhile and pertinent. Not conflictive encounters avoids a control biased analysis, which confirms the claims that drive the technologisation of border controls. But also, and most importantly, because the insight of renown migration scholar Stephen Castles, whereupon potential migrants 'do not decide to stay put just because the receiving state says they are not welcome', is still valid in the context of technologically ever more sophisticated border regimes. 115 In other words, the question how moments of autonomy of migration emerge and persist becomes even more pertinent in the face of attempts to diminish migrants' room for manoeuvre by turning their bodies into a means of mobility control.
